

[redacted]
7 March 1977

Mr. Arnold Beichman

STAT [redacted]

Dear Mr. Beichman:

Thank you for yours of March 1st. You need no credentials with me as I've followed your work over the years and have much respect for it. Contrary to your understanding, I am not in charge of an intergovernmental committee dealing with terrorism. In fact, Ambassador L. Douglas Heck chairs the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and I'm simply a participating member of that working group.

As far as unclassified publications are concerned, I enclose a copy of a somewhat dated study [redacted] which you may find interesting, if you haven't already seen it. I see by your review that you have already read Walter Laqueur's recent book. He seems to me to be among the most realistic and well-informed observers of the problem. I know of no immediate conference planned by the State Department on this subject, but will certainly add you to the list of names of those who might be invited when one is convened.

I hope you are enjoying your stay at Milton. I have a son who went there and also a brother, both of whom enjoyed it immensely and even learned something. Incidentally, [redacted] stayed with us after a visit with their daughter at Milton and mentioned meeting you there.

Sincerely yours,

Cord Meyer, Jr.

Enclosure



The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

University of Massachusetts - Boston

Harbor Campus

Boston, Massachusetts 02125

TELEPHONE (617) 287-1900

1 March 1977

Cord Meyer Jr., Esq.,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Mr. Meyer:

I enclose a copy of a letter to Bill Colby as a "credential." I am writing you because I understand you are in charge of an intergovernmental committee dealing with the problem of "political" terrorism. I was fortunate enough to attend the State Department conference on terrorism last year and found it most useful. I am (a) preparing a course on terrorism at the above institution and (b) working on a book. (It's obvious that terrorism is the latest academic growth industry.) If there are any publications, findings, open research which would be of relevance or if any future conferences are scheduled I would be most grateful to receive the information.

Yours sincerely,

Arnold Beichman
Arnold Beichman,
Associate Professor

STAT



The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

University of Massachusetts - Boston

Harbor Campus

Boston, Massachusetts 02125

TELEPHONE (617) 287-1900

1 March 1977

Dear Bill:

87/ I read in the Times, 27 Feb. that you had published an article in a "recent scholarly journal" on the problem ~~between~~ secrecy and a democratic society. Could you tell me name and date of the journal so I can read text-- or do you have an offprint? Yesterday's editorial in the Wall St. Journal was a masterpiece. I wonder what the Washington Post would have done had it come across the name of Col. Penkovskiiy on the little list? I guess a lot of people are getting an education in reality after all the campaign oratory.

I'm writing Cord Meyer for any open information about terrorism which his task force may have available. I'm working up a course for next Fall and all help ^{for help} will be appreciated. I am not concerned that in asking him/I will become a Michael Selzer. There is an academic saying in European universities which goes like this:

Homo homini lupus
Mulier mulieri lupior
Professorus professori lupissimus.

Beautifully exemplified at Brooklyn College.

I will be in Arizona this weekend at a meeting of labor historians at which the old question of relationships between the AFL and the CIA will come up for debate. It's at Arizona State University.

I hope all goes well with your and yours to whom I sent warmest greetings.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature, likely "Ames", written in cursive.

ARNOLD BEICHMAN
Brzezinski and radicals

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 20, 1977

Dear Arnold,

I loved the column!

Regards,

Zb

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Mr. Arnold Beichman
Associate Professor of Political Science
The University of Massachusetts
Boston, Massachusetts 02116

President-elect Carter and I have at least one thing in common. He told his press Thursday that he had been "an eager student" of Zbigniew Brzezinski "in learning about international affairs" in the last two or three years. So was I, when I was a student at Columbia University a decade ago working for my doctorate in political science. Prof. Brzezinski gave several courses in Soviet affairs, including one seminar, which were among the most popular on the Morningside campus.

Rather than exemplifying the academic ambition to know more and more about less and less, Zbig always knew more and more about more and more.

What remains in the memory about Carter's national security adviser-designate is his personality, a controlled abrasiveness by a man who never suffered fools gladly, particularly, the campus fools -- students and faculty -- who decided in 1968 that Columbia University could be a combination of the Czar's Winter Palace and the Yenan caves.

It was a day in May 1968 when the students for a Democratic Society decided to take over the Columbia School of International Affairs as an alleged partner of the Central Intelligence Agency. When several hundred students arrived at the school on West 114th street, they were met at the entrance by several faculty people, including Brzezinski who bit into a banana while the students jeered and baited their teachers. One professor who had served in Washington explained he had only done so to have a lectern from which to oppose the Johnson Administration's Vietnam policy. It was all pretty pathetic. When it came to Brzezinski, he tossed away the banana skin and said with no visible defiance:

"I'm proud I served in Washington, both personally and professionally, and you students ought to appreciate the fact that because of my service I'm a better teacher because I have seen things with my own eyes."

He refused to express any guilt for his earlier government service. Then he went back to his office.

During that spring, his classes were occasions for protest. The radical contingent plus their fellow-travellers would rise ostentatiously

and walk out as soon as he began. One day, Brzezinski said to them in a tone of ungentle mockery:

"Before you walk out, let me tell you that today's lecture will be about recent revolutionary events at a certain university. That will be the first hour. The second hour will be about Russian foreign policy as usual."

Everybody stayed for that first hour and Brzezinski delivered an allegorical tale about confrontations, barricades, ideologies, revolution and counter-revolution without mentioning Columbia or the administration by name. (The lecture later became an article in the New Republic). When the bell rang to announce the end of the lecture, Brzezinski said that he would go back to the normal class agenda and those who wanted to leave could do so.

The point is that while the classes of guilt-ridden Columbia faculty members were being broken up, he and others like him had no difficulty with student revolutionaries. They seemed to know that he was too hard-nosed to be bullied by Columbia's narodniki who had the mistaken notion that by shaking Columbia they could produce 10 days that would shake the world.

Among Zbig's colleagues, however, there were some, who while admiring his prodigious brainpower, regarded him with the lofty condescension reserved for romantic central European reactionaries. I remember one of his senior colleagues telling me after listening to him, "You must remember Zbig is really a Polish cavalry officer." When I indicated that the meaning of the characterization escaped me, his colleague said, "The Polish cavalry, you know, attacked German tanks at the outset of the war with horses, for God's sake. Zbig's a romantic."

This opinion borders on hyperbole. Far from being a romantic, Zbig has been quite critical of Henry Kissinger and Senator-elect Moynihan, when the latter was US ambassador to the United Nations. In fact, he looked upon "Kissinger's schemes and Moynihan's tactics" as rather threatening "to our national interest."

Arnold Beichman is associate professor of political science, University of Massachusetts at Boston.

For guerrilla warriors, there is only the past

GUERRILLA: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY. By Walter Laqueur. Little Brown & Co., 462 pp. \$17.50

By Arnold Beichman

Professor Laqueur has written what on any other subject might be called the definitive work, except that it really isn't possible to write one on guerrilla warfare. The varieties of "small war" from the dawn of history are endless because human ingenuity and motivation are infinite.

Since the rewards for guerrilla warfare are so great — Tito, Fidel, Mao are but a few examples — there is always bound to be someone willing and ambitious to play David with the slingshot against Goliath with helicopter gunships and "smart" bombs.

The author, visiting professor of history at Harvard, concludes, after a brilliantly researched and documented exordium, that the age of the guerrilla, whether as rural insurgent or urban terrorist, is drawing to a close, that guerrilla warfare

no longer has a future. It is a pleasure to disagree with Professor Laqueur even if it is a bit risky.

Professor Laqueur argues that a determined army or police force, operating without the constraints of public or world opinion or without the controls of a democratic society can crush terrorist and guerrillas; that the prospects for a guerrilla or terrorist victory have dimmed because professional armies now contend for power and because military coups in a large part of the world have become the normal method of political change, not free elections. Lastly, because colonialism is disappearing, a major impulse to guerrilla insurgency will decline. I may not be doing full justice to Professor Laqueur's subtle and richly exemplified thesis but I have given its essence.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn said in his Nobel Prize lecture: "Violence, less and less restricted by the framework of age-old legality, brazenly and victoriously strides throughout the world, unconcerned that its futility has been demonstrated and exposed by history many times."

From a literary point of view, Solzhenitsyn is undoubtedly correct but I wonder if his statement may not be applied more narrowly as a counterargument to Laqueur. Sheer logic and calculation of forces is no more a deterrent to guerrillism than capital punishment is a deterrent to murder or jails to criminal behavior, at least provably.

Most attempted revolutions and coups d'etat fail. Since history is usually written by the victor, we usually only hear about successful guerrillas. The fact that the odds today are even more against insurgents than ever before will not, necessarily, stop them in the future. There will always be somebody who didn't get the message ready to take the risk. It happens in Las Vegas and Monte Carlo all the time.

It is difficult to write equations for a distribution of probabilities when one deals with a multi-causal phenomenon like guerrilla warfare. What would happen if a momentarily quiescent Brezhnev were to reinstate the Khrushchev doctrine of 1961 supporting "wars of national liberation"?

Whatever one's mild quarrel may be, there can be nothing but praise for the enormous amount of new material which the author has uncovered in his polylingual researchers. Bibliographically, the book has no peer. Laqueur has already published widely about those areas where guerrilla warfare has either been episodic, as in present day Europe, or systemic as in Latin America.

As a result he demonstrates a fine grasp of cultural and intellectual history out of which guerrilla doctrines have developed. His politically insightful analyses of past insurgencies, particularly the reasons for the American failure in Vietnam, make "Guerrilla" one of the most important books we shall see in 1977.

Professor Beichman is a member of the political science faculty of UMass-Boston. As a foreign correspondent, he has covered at firsthand guerrilla warfare in Algeria, Yemen and Vietnam.

Aftermath/Arnold Beichman

'UNDERSTANDING' TERROR

There is a simple reason for the persistence of international terrorism, a reason to which Pat Moynihan alluded in his brilliant essay. ["The Totalitarian Terrorists," July 26.] It is that people who should and do know better insist that before you can do anything about this pandemic, it is first necessary to "understand" the reasons for political terror because its practitioners are "different."

I recently reviewed the proceedings of the third annual conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, which was convened to discuss the problem of international terrorism. The assembly comprised experts in the field of international law, one of whom, Professor Paul De Visscher, said:

I don't think it is possible to settle the problem of international terrorism in any conventional fashion without considering the political motives of the perpetrators. . . . To judge what is purely mercenary terrorism and political terrorism by the same judicial standards with no other goal than to repress terrorism is to surrender in advance any hope of finding a solution which, to be useful, must be universal.

To which the distinguished Canadian international lawyer, Professor L. C. Green, replied, as no doubt Moynihan would have:

Motives are, of course, terribly important. But I fear that although a great deal of time is being spent trying to analyze motives, all that is being achieved is to open up avenues to protect *anything* anyone wants to protect. . . . To start introducing other issues which . . . are far less important than dealing with the crime or defining the crime, is getting very close to arguing that the end justifies the means. . . . It is nauseating to constantly hear that we must concern ourselves *only* with the motives of the terrorists—and not with our own interests

Professor De Visscher replied with an ancillary argument that since the world is "split between differing ideol-

ogies," these ideologies are, therefore, "the fundamental factor in international terrorism." De Visscher's views, which are shared by many U.N. members, help explain why it is really impossible to do anything about terrorism. Like other influential figures in the international community, his words grant an indulgence to Colonel Qaddafi, Idi Amin, and their hirelings, thus providing a quasi-legal immunity for their totalitarian actions.

International jurists like De Visscher, who talk about understanding terrorist motives, make it sound fairly easy to do so. But just how does one go about understanding the motives of the Japanese "Red Army," or the Palestine Liberation Organization, or the murderers of an old woman, Dora Bloch, in Uganda? I understand the PLO terrorists: They want to destroy Israel. What then? I accept the existence of "differing ideologies": One of those ideologies wants to extirpate what it calls "bourgeois society." What then? At a recent State Department meeting on international terrorism which I attended, a participant said one of the "motives" of terrorists was "boredom." What is society supposed to do about that? Grant terrorists the highest "motives," moral perfectionism, what then?

At the Canadian conference, a diplomat pointed out that it is impossible to find "an objective legal foundation . . . as the basis for some meaningful action against this menace." The speaker, Edward Lee, Canadian ambassador to Israel, said that the reason for the difficulty is that "acts of international terrorism are intimately linked with certain political struggles. . . ."

The "objective legal foundation"—with a system of shared values as its prerequisite—already exists; Moynihan's highly practical suggestion for an international force to combat terrorism could be achieved—if there is the will. The "objective legal foundation" exists on two levels—military, the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO; and police, the membership of Interpol. Nonmembers of either NATO or Interpol could be invited to join.

All that is needed now to put Moynihan's recommendation into force is that member states of NATO and Interpol demonstrate the same will and courage that Israel demonstrated July 4 at Entebbe Airport.

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The writer is an associate professor of politics, University of Massachusetts.

Democracy seen best defense against certain terrorism

Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat, by Albert Parry. New York: Vanguard Press. 624 pp. \$17.50.

By Arnold Beichman

On Dec. 3, 1973 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) canceled its earlier agreement to allow use by Amnesty International of its facilities for a conference on torture which was to open in Paris a few days later. The reason for UNESCO's sudden action against this respected nongovernmental organization arose from an advance report by Amnesty International which implicated 63 UNESCO member governments in the use of officially-sanctioned torture.

Book review

There's obviously lots of material for a book on government terrorism and Professor Parry has in this quasi-encyclopedic volume included most of the information without sparing the gruesome details. This massive book describes the practices of governments, whether left, right, or merely indescribable, against their citizens in the name of ideology, national stability, moral righteousness, idealism, or leadership megalomania.

Professor Parry also deals with terrorism by individuals or groups whose assaults on innocent bystanders are, they say, legitimated by the right of eminent alienation.

A catalogue of horrors does not make a book, and that is the problem with Professor Parry's effort. For him everything is terror and a category which includes everybody and everything makes distinctions impossible. One of the problems in dealing with the pandemic phenomenon of terrorism (and Professor Parry's deep-rooted knowledge of history demonstrates that terrorism is not a new phenomenon) is how to distinguish between "just" violence and "unjust" violence, between what W. H. Auden once called the "necessary murder" and — what? — the wanton act of mass destruction — Auschwitz, saturation bombing of Dresden, Hiroshima, carpet-bombing in Vietnam, homicide in self-defense, war, capital punishment, Maalot?

Even terrorists seek to make distinctions between "red terror" and "white terror," between "revolutionary terror" and "counter-revolutionary terror," between "liberating violence" and "repressive violence."

There is also a bit of foolishness on the author's part when, writing about Lenin, Trotsky

and Stalin, he says that "their rule of mass-scale murders from 1918 to 1953 had been largely predetermined by the trio's psyches (at the root of their politics), inherent and unfolding long before their coming to power." If such inhuman behavior is predetermined then it seems rather unfair to impute moral guilt to this unholy triumvirate.

The problem with attributing psychic causes to the monstrous behavior of public officials is that it then becomes quite difficult to apportion personal responsibility for their actions as much as it would be to pronounce an ethical judgment against a homicidal sniper who is found to be insane. No doubt one can find a flawed psyche which predetermined Adolf Hitler, too. And the Nuremberg Trial defendants.

Professor Parry's researches and editorial acuity (his citations of Czarist and Soviet archives dealing with terrorism are enviably learned) raise questions about human nature and human rationality, questions which in their implications are frightening. After reading this massive treatise, one can have no doubt that the surest protection against governmental terrorism is a democratic, pluralistic system. Nothing else will do. A one-party state or military junta with no accountability to its people means torture and terror, whether by crude

electrical devices or by the perversion of psychiatry and pharmacology.

The still unanswerable problem — and it is one which is endemic only to open societies — is the anomic killer, who will turn a machine pistol on innocent travelers in an airport or plant bombs in a department store.

Professor Parry writes: "Modern armaments, modern vehicles, and the very latest ingenuities in electronics lend today's terrorists their ability to challenge the Establishment on equal terms or at times even with superior means. . . . Not that the Establishment does not possess enough modern means to fight the terrorists. But when a government is not totalitarian or otherwise autocratic and adheres to democratic precepts and practices, it often lacks the will to use such weapons in time and in sufficient efficiency."

I can think of only one departure in recent years from the behavior pattern of free societies so aptly described by Professor Parry: Entebbe.

Arnold Beichman, associate professor of political science, University of Massachusetts, Boston, has written extensively about terrorism. He recently attended a conference on terrorism convened under the auspices of the Department of State.